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Schumpeter's Creative Destruction:
A Review of the Evidence*
Arthur M. Diamond, Jr.
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Thoughtful scholars from Adam Smith to Jared Diamond, have
asked the same life-and-death question: why do some societies succeed,
and others fail, in producing the goods that make life long, healthy and
prosperous? Smith's answer was basically that when societies adopt the
rules of market capitalism, their economies grow,:and when they do not
adopt the rules of market capitnlism, their economies do not. Since
Smith, other economists have developed more formal models of
economic growth. The classic "Solow growth model" emphasized the
investment of capital. Romer's "New Growth Theory," includes
knowledge as a variable. What is mainly missing from both the new and
the old growth theories is a useful discussion of incentives and
entrepreneurship.
The theories are not just academic abstractions. Policymakers,
wanting to improve the world, sometimes act in part on the basis of the
I first encountered Schumpeter at Wabash College in a wonderful course on
Capitalism, Socialism and Democrag taught by Ben Rogge. The essence of Rogge's
account of Schumpeter was presented in the title essay of his Can Capitalism Survive?
(1979) Angela Kuhlmann provided research assistance. I am grateful to two referees
for thoughtful and useful comments and questions. The current paper is intended to
be a more focused elaboration of a small part of "Schumpeter's Central Message,"
presented at the biennial meetings of the International Schumpeter Society in
Milan, Italy on June 12, 2004. (Several sentences from that paper are reproduced in
this paper.) An earlier version of the current paper was presented to the 2005
meetings of the Association of Private Enterprise Education.
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best theories they can find. For example, Jeffrey Sachs, who has been
an active advisor to many governments, has recently published (2005)
a well-publicized monograph arguing that what is mainly needed to
improve living standards in Africa is the investment of large amounts of
capital.
But a more thoughtful book, The Elusive Quest for Growth by
William Easterly, has looked at the track-record of efforts to achieve
economic growth through capital investment, and finds that the record
is dismal. It is high praise for the character of the founders of the
"classic" and "new" growth theories, that both Robert Solow and Paul
Romer have words of high praise on the back cover of The Elusive,Quest
for Growth. In the form both of true stories, and more systematic
evidence, the book documents the failure of past efforts to help the
poor economies grow. It also contains a chapter arguing for the truth
and importance ofJoseph Schumpeter's account of capitalist economic
growth.
Schumpeter's central message is that the process of creative
destruction describes the form of competition in capitalism that is
capable of dramatic improvements in the quantity and quality of our
lives (Diamond, 2004). Many have noted a recent Schumpeter
renaissance (e.g., DeLong and Summers, 2001; Friedman, 1999;
Rosenberg, 2000; Samuelson, 2003, 467; Useem, 2001). In addition,
Schumpeter's message is being illustrated, rigorously documented,
extended and elaborated by a group of important business practitioners
and academics, notably including monographs by Foster & Kaplan;
Christensen; Christensen & Raynor; and Zook & Allen.
In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democrag, Schumpeter had a lot to
say about his process of "creative destruction," not all of which is given
equal emphasis by those using the phrase today. Here, I will distinguish
two accounts of the process of creative destruction: Schumpeter's
original 'big-is-better' account, and a more recent `small-is-better'
account. The process of creative destruction, in both Schumpeter's
original, and in the more recent account, is a process in which
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technological advance is the main source of economic growth and
improvements in the quality of life. In both accounts, a significant part
of the incentive to produce leapfrogging innovations is the prospect of
achieving monopoly profits. Traditionally the main source of monopoly
profits would have been through patent rights. But currently a full
account of monopoly profits would also include network externalities
as a source (as with eBay and Microsoft).
Beyond what the two accounts share, Schurnpeter's original
'big-is-better' account also claimed that large, monopoly firms are the
most able and the most likely to produce new, leapfrogging innovations.
This version is the one usually, but not always,' associated with
Schumpeter's own views. The 'small-is-better' account identifies smaller,
often start-up, firms as the most likely source of new leapfrog
innovation. I argue elsewhere (2004) that the `small-is-better' account
is what the vast majority of authors have in mind when they apply the
phrase "creative destruction" to competition among computer and
intemet related firms.
Schumpeter's claim was that the new process or product that
results from a dynamic leapfrogging innovative competition, is more
important in understanding capitalism, than the static standard model
of price competition that emphasizes unconcentrated markets as the
means to lowering prices, where the goods and the technologies are
assumed constant. If one set of rules (standard price competition)
maximized one good result (lower prices for consumers); and another
set of rules (creative destruction) maximized another good result (new
products), then we would have to measure the utility produced by each
'Anne Mayhew has argued (1980) that Schumpeter did not believe that larger firms
were necessarily more likely to innovate than smaller firms.
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of the good results, which is very hard to do.' What if the creative
destruction is not only best at producing new products, but also, in
creating new processes, is also best at lowering prices for consumers?
Then we would know the essential fact about capitalism, without having
to decide whether consumers benefit more from lower prices for a
constant set of goods, or from a set of goods of higher price, but of
increasing variety and quality.
In what follows, I begin by briefly discussing some evidence
against the standard price competition model. I then proceed to discuss
the benefits of the leapfrogging competition from creative destruction.
Finally, I discuss the evidence against the `big-is-better' account and
favor of the 'small is better' account.
Evidence Against the Standard Model of Price Competition
Schumpeter famously claimed that to discuss capitalism without
mentioning the process of creative destruction would be like discussing
the play Hamlet, without mentioning the Danish prince (1950, 83-85).
But, in fact, the most common way to discuss capitalism, in
Schumpetees day and our own, is to omit creative destruction, and
focus instead on price competition as the essential element.
The standard model of price competition that is presented in
almost all principles of microeconomics texts, tells us that in an
unconcentrated market with many small suppliers, the consumer will
'Comparing the benefits from lower prices with those from new products would
not be easy. We have highly mathematical models of price competition, and widely
understood graphical approximations of these models. Of related, and perhaps
equal importance, we have well-understood and frequently-applied methods for
measuring the benefits from static competition (notably the consumer surplus
concept). In contrast we do not have any widely-accepted mathematical models or
graphical approximations explaining the process of creative destruction. And even
more importantly, we have found it extremely difficult to measure the benefits of
the new product or the new process.
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pay lower prices than she would if the same market were more
concentrated. The case is strongest when comparing "pure"
competition with monopoly. But even there, it rests on assumptions
that are not necessarily true, such as that costs would be the same under
either market structure. It thus rules out the possibility that monopolies
may have lower costs, either through technological improvements, or
through economies of scale.
If a large firm, or monopoly, has either sufficiently better
technological processes, or economies of scale, then the firm may be
earning substantial monopoly profits at the same time that it both
lowers prices to the consumer, and introduces important process and
product innovations.' This is what happened in the famous case of
Standard Oil. At the beginning of its ascent in 1870, the price of refined
kerosene was 26 cents a gallon, and Standard Oil's cost to produce it
was 3 cents a gallon. At the height of its market power in 1885, the price
of refined kerosene was 8 cents a gallon, and Standard Oil's cost to
produce it was .452 cents a gallon (Armentano, 70). The evidence on
Standard Oil suggests that Rockefeller was able to greatly improve the
production process, 4 allowing both great profits for himself, and
substantially lower prices for consumers.
In more recent times, many analysts (e.g., Simchi-Levi, et al,
2003, 63-64) have painted a similar picture of Wal-Mart. The company
has leapfrogged other retailers in the use of information technology to
'It is not c16:r that we should care how rich some short-term near-monopollists
get as long as the consumer benefits with lower prices and better products. But for
those who do care, it may be reassuring that William Nordhaus has found that, for
the economy as a whole, the size of monopoly profits due to Schumpeterian
monopolies is fairly small.
'Ron Chernow in his massive biography of Rockefeller provides extensive
discussions of how production processes improved under Rockefeller (e.g., pages
79, 100, and especially pages 179-181).
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manage the logistics of the supply chain, and to understand patterns of
consumer demand. As a result, the company has both been highly
profitable, and provided the consumer with lower prices.
Another case where the firm may have earned substantial profits
at the same time that it lowered prices for the consumer may have been
what happened with Microsoft. For example, in the early days one
reason that Microsoft's DOS became dominant was that it -Was priced
significantly lower than Gary Kildahl's CP /M operating system (Carroll,
1993, 41). For the later period of Microsoft market share dominance,
Schmalensee has presented plausible calculations that Microsoft was
charging much less than what would be expected from the theory of
monopoly-pricing (see Gilbert and Katz, 29).5
Evidence that Innovation Competition Matters
Although we are still an early stage of understanding, some
progress has recently been made in measuring the benefits to consumers
of new product innovation through the process of creative destruction.
I will summarize here a couple of papers that illustrate the progress.
One particularly illuminating paper is Nordhaus (1997), in which the
author compares changes in the true price of light, with changes as
measured by traditional price indexes. Traditional price indexes would
be based on changes in the price of the good that produces the light
(e.g., the bulb) rather than changes in the price of the service being
'Besides the empirical evidence sketched here, both Demsetz and Baumol, et. al.,
have presented theoretical arguments to suggest that highly concentrated markets
may often offer the consumer prices that are as low as those offered in
unconcentrated markets. These arguments assume the barriers are not too high to
potential competition, and that the incumbents in the market lower their prices to
deter entry. Observations of the price competitiveness of many high concentrated,
oligopolistic markets (e.g., airlines since deregulation, breakfast cereals, satellite
radio), also challenges the usual conclusion that low prices are more likely in an
unconcentrated market structure of many small firms.
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produced, in this case illumination. One advantage of the case of light
is that measures of illumination for various light-producing goods are
readily obtainable and do not require the estimation of hedonic price
functions, as is required, for instance, in obtaining a price index for the
services from computers. For his case, Nordhaus concludes that
"traditional price indexes of lighting vastly overstate the increase in lighting prices
over the last two centuries, and the true rise in living standards in this sector has
consequently been vastly understated" (30, italics in original)
In order to understand how representative the lighting sector is
of the economy as a whole, Nordhaus classifies (58-60) sectors of the
economy into one of three categories: "run-of-the-mill," "seismically
active," and "tectonically active." The run-of-the-mill sectors are ones
in which either products have changed relatively little since 1800, or else
ones for which current price indexes will likely be able to capture most
of the changes in quality. The seismically active sectors are those in
which the products are still recognizable from 1800, but the quality and
characteristics have changed so substantially that current indexes do a
poor job of measuring changes. The tectonically active sectors are those
in which the changes in product and production process are so large
that the current price indexes do not begin to capture the gains.
Of total consumption dollars in 1991 in the U.S., the
run-of-the-mill sector was 27.7%, the seismically active sector was
35.8%, and the tectonically active sector was 36.6%. The bias in the
current price indexes would thus be expected to be quite large. To
illustrate how large, Nordhaus estimates how much the change in real
wages from 1800-1992 would be if we make reasonable assumptions
about the size of the bias. Using current price indexes, the real wage in
1992 was 13 times the real wage in 1800. By the lowest reasonable
estimate of the bias, the real wage in 1992 was 40 times the real wage in
1800. By the highest reasonable estimate of the bias, the real wage in
1992 was 190 times the teal wage in 1800.
Another paper that illustrates the progress that is being made in
measuring the consumers' gain from leapfrogging technological
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innovation, is a paper by Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2003). Gates
(1995) and others had argued that the primary benefit of the internet to
consumers was that it would result in lower prices for goods and
services. This would occur primarily through quicker, more accurate,
and cheaper information about the products and services. In the
Brynjolfsson et al paper they measure the gains in consumer surplus for
one sector of the internet: online booksellers. They then use techniques
recently developed by Hausman and others, to measure the gain to
consumers from the greater variety of books made available through
internet booksellers. For the single year 2000, they estimate that the
increased consumer surplus from increased price competition from
internet booksellers falls in a range between $100.5 million and $103.3
million (1591). But for the same period, they estimate that the increased
consumer surplus from an increase in variety of books from internet
booksellers falls in a range between $731 million and $1.03 billion
(1590). These results imply that at a minimum the internet's
contribution to leapfrogging innovation is 7.3 times as large as the
internees contribution to lower prices.
Notice that the intemet is a general purpose technology, whose
applications have resulted in new innovations (e.g., online travel
services, online brokers) that have leapfrogged older services. And
notice that this leapfrog-enabling technology has both resulted in lower
consumer prices, and resulted in new products and services.
We have examined two types of technological advance, and
discussed the evidence of the magnitude of the benefits to consumers
in each case. The advances in lighting represented a series of leapfrog
innovations, the main effect of which was to enormously reduce the
price of lighting to consumers (as measured in labor time required per
unit of illumination). The advances in book-retailing, enabled by the
internet, occurred through a new online retailer (Amazon) developing
processes that benefited consumers in terms of price, but also, and even
more dramatically, in terms of the variety of the product available.
Individual cases can be suggestive, but the importance of
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creative destruction through leapfrogging competition would be
strengthened if a broader case could be made. For example, if creative
destruction is the essential fact about capitalism, we would expect that
the more open the economy is to creative destruction, the faster will be
the rate of technological advance, and the greater will be the
improvements in longevity, health and quality of life. It is plausible to
argue that the United States during the twentieth century was a notable
exemplar of openness to creative destruction.' If so, then evidence for
substantial . technological advance, and improvements in longevity,
health and quality of life, would create a strong presumption for creative
destruction indeed being the essential fact about capitalism. In the
paragraphs that follow, I will present some such evidence, first in the
form of a vivid story from the life of John D. Rockefeller, and then in
the form of summarizing some of the findings of economists DeLong,
Gordon, and Fogel.
In the year 1900, John D. Rockefeller was the richest person on
the face of the earth.' Besides what it tells us about medical progress in
the 20' century, the following episode in Rockefeller's long life may also
help us answer the question of which levels of society benefit most
from creative destruction.
Rockefeller's daughter Edith had two sons, Jack and Fowler,
whom Rockefeller "doted" on. In late 1900, at roughly the age of four,
both boys came down with scarlet fever. Rockefeller was devastated and
'Nicholas has argued (2003, 1025) that the United States was especially open to
creative desstruction in the decade on the 1920s.
71<kpper and Gunther's The Wealthy 100 (1996)ranks Rockefeller as the richest
American in the History of the United States, based on estimated total wealth at
the time of death, as a percentage of GNP at the time of death. See also:
"Rockefeller, you know, is reputed the richest man in the world,..." (William James
in letter to Henry James, January 29, 1904, quoted in Chernow, ix). Chemow
himself describes Rockefeller as the "...world's richest investor..." (Chernow, 373).
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offered a New York physician a half a million dollars if he could cure
the boys. If we correct for inflation over the past 105 years, that would
be over $11 million, in 2005 dollars.' Edith's relationship with her father
frequently had been strained: she was a free spirit, and he was not. But
at the end of this episode, she wrote a letter to John D. Rockefeller,
saying:
As long as I live I shall never forget the great love and the
untiring effort which you put forth to save dear Jack's life . . .
Absolutely forgetful of self and showing a love much like the
Christ love. (Edith Rockefeller McCormick as quoted in
Chernow, 1998, 417-418)
Jack died of scarlet fever on January 2, 1901.
The Merck Manual, a leading physicians' medical desk reference,
says: "Scarlet fever (scarlatina) is uncommon today, presumably because
antibiotic therapy prevents the infection from progressing or causing
epidemics." (Beers and Berkow, 1999, 1152) The "drug of choice" for
scarlet fever is penicillin (1153). Although "discovered" by Fleming in
1928, penicillin only became broadly useful after 1940, when Florey,
Chain and Heatley discovered a practical way to extract penicillin from
mold (see: Lax, 2004).
In 1900, many came down with scarlet fever, and there was a
significant risk of death from the disease, even if you were the grandson
of the richest person on earth. In 2000, in the West, few come down
with scarlet fever, and there is no significant risk of death from the
disease, even if you are living at the official U.S. poverty threshold.
sTo make this calculation, I used historical data from p. 210-211, of Part 1 of
Bureau of the Census 1975, for the years from 1900 through 1967. For the years
1967 through February 2005, I used data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
rekported online by the St. Louis Federal Reserve at:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/CPIAUCNS.txt.
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Although this sort of evidence is not ubiquitous in the
mainstream economics literature, it is also not totally without precedent
(Adam Smith, 1937, 12; Schunapeter, 1950,67; DeLong, 2000; Gordon,
2000; Fogel, 2004, 2005). The most ambitious recent version, in both
form and substance has been presented (2000, 21-23) in a draft chapter
of Bradford DeLong's long-awaited economic history of the United
States. DeLong's version begins with the question (21): "What multiple
of average income per capita a century ago would be required for that
household to feel equally well-off in a material sense, if it were
transported back in time?" His first answer (22) is that the multiple
would have to be "very large indeed." Personalizing the question, he
suggests (23) that even with a very large multiple, "we would not be
happy."' He explains:
I would want, first, health insurance: the ability to go to the
doctor and be treated with late-twentieth-century medicines.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was crippled by polio. Nathan
Meyer Rothschild—the richest man in the world in the first half
of the nineteenth century—died of an infected abscess. Without
antibiotic and adrenaline shots I would now be dead of
childhood pneumonia. The second thing I would want would
be utility hookups: electricity and gas, central heating, and
consumer appliances. The third thing I want to buy is access to
information: audio and video broadcasts, recorded music,
computing power, and access to databases. None of these were
available at any price back in 1890 (23; on the Rothschild
information, DeLong cites Landes 1998 citing Wilson 1994).
'The sort of argument sketched by DeLong could be objected to on the grounds
that it seems to ignore the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. Sen (1976)
and others have noted that one can only rank changing consumption bundles for
the same group of consumers.
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The rest of DeLong's chapter is full of details about how improvements
in technology over the century improved the length and quality of life.
Under a paper heading entitled "How the Great Inventions
Helped Us Escape from the Bad Old Days" (57), Robert Gordon
devotes several paragraphs to summarizing some of the key findings in
Otto Bettmann's The Good Old Day—Thy Were Terrible (1974). The
book is richly illustrated from Bettrnann's own archivel° of historical
photographs and illustrations from the period 1860-1900. He highlights
the stench and disease resulting from the filth of garbage and
manure-filled city streets—manure from the horses used for
transportation, and from the pigs allowed to roam free to eat the
garbage. He highlights the isolation of rural life, the tedium and physical
exhaustion from cooking in fireplaces, and cleaning clothes by muscle
power. He highlights, the long hours, dangerous, and unhealthy working
conditions of many workers.
He also highlights five "great inventions" that he argues vastly
improved the ordinary person's length and quality of life: 1) electricity,
2) the internal combustion engine, 3) chemical engineering (leading, e.g.,
to plastics and medicines), 4) communications inventions (including the
telegraph, telephone, and radio), and 5) running water and indoor
plumbing. He finally appeals to our subjective judgment of the
significance of these great inventions to support his conclusion that the
intemet is a less important innovation in improving our lives. (This
latter part of his argument can be rebutted, if we accept Paul David's
(1990) account, based on the history of the electric engine, that with
general purpose technologies, the main benefits may not be foreseen in
the early years or decades of the innovation—we are still learning the
uses of computers and the internet, and some of the greatest gains may
'The archive has been acquired by Bill gates.
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still lie ahead).11
Nobel-prize winner Robert Fogel has systematically summarized
the improvements in longevity and health over the last three centuries,
and forecast the possibilities for the century to come, in his 2004
monograph The Eseapefrom Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100. More
recently (2005), he has presented some of the main messages of the
book in a briefer, more accessible, and more vivid form. In his 2005
essay he compares the health experiences of three cohorts, those born
between 1835-1845, 1920-1930, and 1980-1990. The first cohort was
roughly the cohort that fought the Civil War, the second cohort was
roughly the cohort that fought World War II and the third cohort was
roughly the cohort of today's college-aged students. Roughly 40% of the
Civil War cohort died before the age of 15, compared with toughly 11°A
of the World War II cohort and roughly 1% of the college-aged cohort.
Fogel describes life for the Civil War cohort as being not only short, but
also nasty, as compared with the World War II cohort. Even when they
survived, the cohort suffered from a variety of chronic and debilitating
illnesses and conditions. Of those who survived to their late 30s, more
than half were disabled. Large numbers suffered and died from malaria
in the South and from tuberculosis in the cities. Chronic malnutrition
was common.
Many more of the World War II cohort survived to old age, and
of those, "the overwhelming majority have good to excellent health, live
independent lives, and are socially active" (7). Fogel attributes the
improvements to what he (and Dora Costa) call "technophysio
evolution," which has resulted from "a synergism between technological
advances and physiological improvements" (7). Some examples he
emphasizes include the chlorination of water, the pasteurization of milk,
and the elimination in cities of diseases spread by pulverized horse
"This case has been made in Thomas Friedman's The World is Flat, and in several
papers co-authored by Brynjolfsson ( e.g., Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).
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manure.
Extrapolating current trends, Fogel forecasts that the median
life span for the current college-aged cohort will be roughly 100 years.
But there is nothing inevitable in this; if institutions change to slow or
quicken the rate of technophysio evolution, progress in increasing the
lifespan will likewise slow or quicken.
There have been substantial improvements in the variety and
characteristics of goods available in the last 100 years, as illustrated by
the Rockefeller story, as sketched by DeLong, and as elaborated by
Fogel. The most basic change has been in health, but there have been
other basic changes as well, e.g., the richest person on earth could not
have bought an air conditioned home in 1900.
Evidence for the 'Small-is-Better' Account of Creative Destruction
The 'big-is-better' account has been shown to not generally be
true. Referring to this version, Scherer reports that in his substantial
1965 empirical study:
The results suggested that Schumpeter's assertions in Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democrag were more wrong than right. Giant
monopolistic corporations were not uniquely efficacious
engines of technological advance. (2005, 394)
Also relevant is the Acs and Audresch (1990) research showing
that optimal firm size for innovation significantly varied by industry.
Most notably, Christensen and his co-authors (2000, 2003, 2004) have
presented substantial theory and evidence of how hard it is for an
incumbent firm to successfully introduce a disruptive innovation.
The evidence of rapid and increasing turnover among the
largest, most powerful, firms, by various measures, is evidence that
supports the 'small-is-better account of creative destruction. This
evidence would include that discussed in Foster and Kaplan.'s Creative
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Destruction, in Zook and Allen's Profit  from the Core, and in Stall Points.
Also, and perhaps most powerfully, the evidence and theories in a
variety of books, articles and case studies by Christensen and
co-authors, support the `small-is-better' account.
A common form of evidence for the small-is-better account
consists of data showing how hard it is for large dominant firms to
remain large and dominant for an extended period. One good source
for this sort of data is Foster and Kaplan's Creative Destruction. For
example, they examine the fate of the firm's in Forbes' 1917 list of 100
largest firms. By 1987,61 of these firms no longer even existed. And of
the 39 that still existed, only 18 were still among the largest 100. Figure
1 lists these 18 firms. Of the 18, only two had a growth rate in 1987 that
was higher than the average for U.S. firms.
Foster and Kaplan also present evidence in their book (11) that
in 1998 the turnover rate of the S&P 500 was approximately 10%,
implying that the average firm could expect to remain in the S&P 500
for only approximately 10 years. This contrasts with a turnover rate of
about 1.5% in the 1920s and 1930s—a rate that implies an expectation
of a roughly 65 year average tenure in the S&P 500. The declining
length of tenure in the S&P 500 might be evidence to support the claim
of some (e.g., Greenspan; see Useem, 2001) that the process of creative
destruction has been speeding up in the United States. The increasing
pace of creative destruction is also independently supported in Chun,
Kim, Lee and Morck, 2004.
Figure 2 from the Corporate Strategy Board is part of an
extensive report that the Board presented to its large-scale corporate
clients, documenting how hard it has been for large companies to
maintain credible growth records. Zook and Allen (2001, 12) also
provide additional evidence of how hard it is for large firms to sustain
growth.
Besides evidence of the frequency and speed with which firms
grow, and decline, another sort of evidence for the growing ubiquity of
creative destruction in the United States economy is provided by the
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Figure 1. Of 18 Out of 100 Who Remained in Largest 100, All But
Two Underperform U.S. Average Growth
(Reproduced from: Foster & Kaplan, 2001 8)
Long-Term Survivor Performance
1
Growth in Market Capitalization CAGR 1917-1987, %
General Electric
Eastman Kodak
Wont
Sears, Roebuck
Ford Motor
General Moters
Exxon
Procter &Gamble
Amoco
Westinghouse Electric
Chevron
Mobil
Texaco
Pacific Gas & Electric
Citibank
Southern California Edison
AT&T
USX
Source: Forbes, July 1987
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Figure 2: Few Companies Sustain Growth
(Source: Stall Points, 1998, p. 15, as reproduced in:
http://www.csfb.com/home/research_and_commentary/html/docs/3096848.pdf
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growing list of well-documented, or at least plausible, recent examples.
One of the richest sources of such recent examples would be a set of
three recent books authored, or co-authored, by Clayton Christensen
(2000, 2003, 2004).
On May 11, 2004 among the 2,866 books on Amazon.com's
"Search Inside the Book" feature that reference Schumpeter, the
number-one bestselling book was Christensen and Raynor's Innovator's
Solution. Like Schumpeter, Christensen had early experience in business,
serving as chairman and president of Ceramics Process Systems
Corporation. His earlier book, The Innovator's Dilemma, was widely
acclaimed, receiving the Financial Times' Global Business Award for
being the "best business book" for 1998.
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The "dilemma" in Christensen's Innovator's Dilemma belongs to
the incumbent firm." Christensen distinguishes between two sorts of
innovations. Sustaining innovations are innovations that will be valued
by the incumbent firm's mainstream customers. The incumbent firm
will pursue sustaining innovations, generally with success. The dilemma
arises with the disruptive innovations. Disruptive innovations initially
do not appeal to the mainstream customers of the incumbent firm.
They frequently are too small, or to slow, or otherwise undexperform
what the mainstream customers want.
Christensen's most extensive example in the first book discusses
successive generations of hard drives. The initial 5.25-inch hard drives
did not have the capacity that mini-computer users wanted, so they had
no interest in them. When the 8-inch drive companies listened to their
mini-computer manufacturer customers, they saw no reason to develop
the 5.25-inch drives. But there was a small niche market among personal
computer users, who valued the 5.25-inch drives because of their small
size. Start-up firms pursued this niche market and improved the
technology over time, until it was increasingly competitive along all
dimensions, with the 8-inch drives. By then it was too late for the
incumbent firms to master the technology fast enough and well-enough
to compete with the start-ups. The same story was repeated with
successive generations of hard drive technology.
The first book provides extensive documentation of the hard
drive example, and significant documentation on a second example:
mechanical excavators. Much briefer discussion of other examples is
also included. In the second book, Innovator's Solution, written with
Raynor, Christensen lengthens the list of examples, and elaborates the
theory of how hard it is for incumbent firms to survive in the face of
'An extensive literature exists suggesting that large firms may have problems
innovating due to inertia and problems with their internal incentive structure. See,
e.g., Berle and Means (1932); Henderson (1993).
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disruptive innovations. Although good examples occur throughout the
book, a particularly efficient compilation of many examples occurs in
the table on pages 56-65. Some of the cases in the table that seem good
candidates to be major examples of successful leapfrogging competition,
would include the following. Minicomputer makers such as Digital
Equipment, leapfrogged mainframe makers such as IBM. PC makers
such as Apple and Compaq, leapfrogged minicomputer makers such as
Digital Equipment. Dell's direct retailing model, leapfrogged the
previously leading PC retailers, Compaq, HP, and IBM. Online brokers
such as Ameritrade and Schwab leapfrogged traditional brokerages such
as Merrill Lynch. Online travel agencies such as Expedia, leapfrogged
bricks-and-mortar agencies such as American Express. Department
stores such as Macy's and Marshall Fields, leapfrogged small
shopkeepers. Discount stores such as Krnart and Wal-Mart, leapfrogged
department stores such as Macy's and Marshall Fields.
Conclusions and Implications for Action
Although the evidence for the truth and importance of creative
destruction is being increasingly accumulated and recognized, I argue
elsewhere (Diamond, 2004) that the importance of creative destruction
is not being very effectively communicated to a wider audience, nor is
it being applied to relevant policy issues, such as antitrust. It is highly
plausible that our rate of economic growth would increase if we
adopted policies making our economy more open to creative
destruction.'
"As part of an argument that we can significantly increase the rate of economic
growth through institutional change, Romer makes the case for optimism: "Given
the limited state of our knowledge of the process of technological change, we have
no way to estimate what the upper bound on the feasible rate of growth for an
economy might be. If economists had tried to make a judgment as the end of the
19th century, they would have been correct to argue that there was no historical
precedent that could justify the possibility of an increase in the trend rate of
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Schumpeter's process of creative destruction states that
technological advance is the main source of economic growth and
improvements in the quality of life. It further states that a significant
part of the incentive to produce leapfrogging innovations is the
prospect of achieving monopoly profits. The original 'big-is-better'
account adds the view that large incumbent firms are most likely to be
the source of leapfrogging innovations. In contrast, the new
`small-is-better' account adds the view that small, new firms are most
likely to be the source of leapfrogging innovations.
I have argued that the benefits of leapfrogging innovations are
difficult to measure, but that recently progress is being made, mainly
through the careful examination of particular cases, such as advances in
lighting and the introduction of the internet. While case studies are
accumulated and generalized, I argue that the openness of the American
economy to creative destruction, and the associated high levels of
economic growth, and living standards, support a presumption in favor
of creative destruction as the essential fact about capitalism.
I also have discussed the evidence against the old 'big-is-better'
version of creative destruction and in favor of the new `small-is-better'
version. I find that there is substantial and growing evidence that
leapfrogging innovations are at least as likely to arise from small, new
firms, as from old, large firms.
In future work, I plan to answer an important question that is
neglected in the current paper: how big is the destructive part of
creative destruction? Or put differently: how much are workers hurt?
Cox and Alm (2003, and 2004 with Holmes) show some evidence that
workers may actually benefit from creative destruction, in the sense that
the jobs created are better jobs than jobs destroyed. But this evidence
needs to be further analyzed. In the more distant future, an important
growth of income per capita to 1.8% per year. Yet this increase is what we
achieved in the 20th century" (Romer, 226).
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extension of the current research would be to construct an index of the
economy's "openness to creative destruction," and then to empirically
examine the relationship of such an index to measures of technological
innovation and economic growth.
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